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I INTRODUCTION 
Higher education has emerged as a major Canadian industry over the last decade, 
absorbing a rapidly increasing share of the nation's resources. Illustrations of this point 
are readily available. If we compare data for 1971-72, the latest year for which com-
prehensive figures are available, with data for 1960-61, we find that participation rates in 
Canada reached a point in 1971 where the number of full-time post-secondary students 
was equal to 18.6 per cent of the 18-24 age group. In 1966 it stood at 14.4 per cent, 
and in 1961 at 10.6 per cent. Total expenditures by post-secondary institutions rose more 
than sevenfold from 1960-61 to 1971-72. Whereas such institutional expenditures amount-
ed to less than 0.9 per cent of GNP in 1960-61, they accounted for roughly 2.6 per cent 
of GNP in 1971-72. In addition, student aid from governmental sources and the post-
secondary institutions in 1971-72 was twenty-five times total student aid in 1960-61. 
These statistics are impressive. It is also clear that this most rapid development 
in the post-secondary sector in our history resulted from the passing of the Federal-
Provincial Arrangements Act in 1967, which encompassed provisions for cost-sharing in 
higher education. During the first five years of the program, the number of full-time 
students in universities, colleges and other post-secondary institutions across Canada 
increased by 191,000 to a total of 501,000. This gain exceeded by a wide margin the 
full-time enrolment increase recorded in any previous five-year period. In addition to 
full-time students, an estimated 250,000 persons attended post-secondary institutions on a 
part-time basis in 1971, and another 200,000 were high school students at the senior 
matriculation level.1 
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Figures on the financial side are equally eloquent. Transfers from the Federal to 
the Provincial Governments in support of post-secondary education will this year amount 
to nearly $1.1 billion, a substantial rise from the $422 million level in 1967-68 ! It is 
estimated that taking all forms of support for post-secondary education into account, 
higher education accounted for fully 6.4 per cent of gross federal expenditures in the 
latest year for which comprehensive data are available. 
The expiry in 1974 of the current federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangements for 
post-secondary education provides all of those involved in post-secondary education — 
academics — administrators — students — with a valuable opportunity to assess where 
we have been going and where we should be going. The subject has, of course, recently 
absorbed the attention of several Commissions appointed by the Provincial Governments. 
The Federal Government has also been examining its future role in post-secondary 
education. While it is too early to comment on the current federal-provincial negotiations 
concerning future financing arrangements for higher education, it may be appropriate to 
review past federal experience in post-secondary education and to raise some of the 
questions which, in my opinion, should be considered in assessing the desirable future 
federal role. 
II REAL vs. FINANCIAL FLOWS IN POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION 
In the economics of post-secondary education, the "real" flows — the resources 
consumed and the benefits created within the educational sector, must be distinguished 
from the web of financial flows by which purchasing power is transferred among sectors 
of the economy to balance the actual resource costs of educational activity. These "real" 
flows reflect the demand for those skills or talents resulting from formal education, 
balanced against the costs, both capital outlays and operating expenditures, of mounting 
educational activities. 
The demand for skills, talents, or knowledge creates an induced demand for places 
at educational institutions or a demand for educational services (courses, facilities, etc.). 
This demand for a place at an institution, perceived by the educational sector to be an 
important determinant of educational outlays, is the result of the decision by each 
individual to seek entry, having weighed his desire for more formal education against 
some perception of likely costs. 
Governments attempt to reflect social consensus regarding the overall value of 
education to society by influencing, via financial and other policies, the size and structure 
of the total educational sector. Thus they determine the amount and kind of facilities to 
be made available — that is, the supply of educational opportunities which will interact 
with the student's own demands. Educational institutions then attempt to accommodate 
these influences by providing the facilities and talents to mount educational activities, 
within the resource constraints imposed by governments. Total demands for places are 
rationed via fees, setting academic standards, or other means. The costs incurred by the 
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institutions in providing educational activities, together with the costs incurred by the 
students as a result of their participation in those activities, constitute what may be 
called the costs of the educational process. 
As we have seen, student enrolment is a critical factor for government planners 
as well as post-secondary educators. Such enrolment can be described as the product of 
two basic elements : 
1) the total size of the age group from which post-secondary students are normally 
drawn ; and 
2) the participation rate relevant for that age group. 
Around 80 per cent of the post-secondary student body is currently drawn from 
the 18 to 24 years age group, and this age group will continue to supply the vast majority 
of recruits to post-secondary education, despite the trend towards greater "continuing" 
or adult education. As Chart 1 indicates, the period of rapid rates of increase in the 18 
to 24 population is over. For the balance of the 1970's the rate of growth in this age-
group, according to our projections, will be significantly below the 4-5 per cent rates 
experienced in the 1963-69 period, and will decline continuously for at least the next 
10 years. Projections indicate that the total number in the age group will actually decline 
in 1983-84. 
The second basic determinant of post-secondary enrolment is the proportion of 
the population in "eligible" age-groups which chooses to participate in higher education. 
Chart 2 shows the historical experience and projections of the trend in the participation 
rate for the 18 to 24 years age group. As can be seen, this participation rate almost doubled 
from around 10 per cent in I960 to approximately 19 per cent in 1972, but its rate of 
growth has tapered off since 1970. Projections suggest a continued increase in the 
participation rate for this age group in the next decade, although the rate of growth will 
not be as rapid as that experienced in the 1960's. It is worth noting that projections of 
participation rates summarize all that is discretionary in individual enrolment decisions. 
If attitudes of young people swing markedly against formal education, or if they respond 
to higher fees by staying away, these projected rates may prove far too high. If a budding 
"leisure society" swings toward the individual satisfactions associated with education, 
these forecast participation rates could be low. The point is that a consistent analysis 
should take into consideration the likely impact of policy changes upon individual 
decisions and their consequences for these estimated participation rates. 
Finally, projections of the total number of students who will enrol in post-
secondary education in the next decade are given in Chart 3. As well as taking into 
account changes in the size of age groups and the participation rate of the 18 to 24 
population, these projections incorporate assumptions about the growth rates in : participa-
tion in other age groups (greater growth is anticipated in participation rates for adults 
116 S T O A 
CHART 1 
TOTAL POPULATION GROWTH 
AGE GROUP 18 TO 24 YEARS 
1961 TO 1984 
continuing their education than for youths in the 18 to 24 years age group) ; full-time 
and part-time schooling (the latter is expected to grow faster) ; and enrolment in univer-
sities and the nonuniversity post-secondary sector (the latter is expected to grow faster). 
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CHART 4 
BASIC STRUCTURE OF POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION 
FINANCING FLOWS 1969-70 ($ MILLIONS) 
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about the current federal-provincial fiscal transfer arrangements for post-secondary educa-
tion, are not likely to be repeated in the foreseeable future. 
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III THE FLOW OF FUNDS IN POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION 
It was noted above that the real flow of resources into the educational sector can 
be distinguished from the network of financial arrangements which ultimately support 
(and influence) that real resource commitment. 
Chart 4 presents a "snapshot" view of flows of funds in post-secondary education 
in a recent year. The Chart traces flows of funds from the ultimate suppliers of funds 
(the federal, provincial and municipal governments, the private sector of the economy 
and students) through intermediate allocators of funds (such as the provincial govern-
ments) to the two eventual spenders of educational funds (the educational institutions 
and students). 
(1) The Major Flows 
As. indicated by the numerals 1-3 in Chart 4, federal support of post-secondary 
education is accomplished through three main channels : direct support of institutions by 
such means as the funding of research and the operation of military colleges ; transfers 
to the provinces under the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act; and direct support 
of students through student aid plans. These three channels of finance also indicate the 
principal instruments by which the structure of post-secondary education can be affected 
in the future. Working within the flow-of-funds framework, moreover, it is evident that 
possible changes in these instruments cannot be discussed in isolation, either from each 
other or from other financial flows in post-secondary education. 
(2) Recent Trends in Sources and Uses of Funds 
In contrast to the "snapshot" view of financial flows at one point in time illus-
trated in Chart 4, the changes occurring over time in the volume and sources of funds 
flowing to the two ultimate spenders in post-secondary education — institutions and 
students — can also be shown as in Charts 5 and 6. 
Chart 5 indicates that important changes have ocurred in the sources of funds 
flowing to institutions over the last decade. Federal funds now account for roughly one-
half of all post-secondary institutional operating expenditures, as opposed to approxi-
mately one-fifth in 1960-61. Funds from other levels of government have declined in 
relative importance as a source of post-secondary institutional revenues over the past 
decade. However, Chart 5 shows the increasingly overwhelming dominance of all levels 
of government as a source of funds for the post-secondary institutions. Whereas govern-
mental funds already accounted for two-thirds of institutional revenues in 1960-61, by 
1970-71 four-fifths of institutional revenues were derived from governmental sources. 
Corresponding to the rising importance of governmental funds as a source of 
institutional revenues over the last decade is the declining importance of student fees, 
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CHART 5 


























which now amount to only ten per cent of institutional expenditures. Such calculations 
of the contributions of students to the cost of their own education might also take account 
of government transfers paid directly to students. Substracting the total non-loan govern-
mental aid to students from total fees paid reveals that the net contribution of students 
was reduced to 1.9 per cent of the operating expenditures of post-secondary institutions 
in 1969-70. I realize, of course, that student aid is used to support living expenses of some 
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CHART 6 
TOTAL STUDENT AID BY TYPE AND BY SOURCE 
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students as well as to pay the fees of the educational institutions so that the student con-
tribution to the total costs of post-secondary education is considerably greater than 1:9 per 
cent. 
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(3) Federal Government Support of Institutions, 
Provinces, and Students 
Direct federal support to post-secondary institutions encompasses such activities 
as operation of the military colleges, subsidies for research, and the training of registered 
nurses. Assisted research has been the fastest growing component of direct federal support 
for institutions, and now accounts for 60 per cent of direct federal subsidies to institutions. 
The most rapidly growing element of total federal expenditures on post-secondary 
education has been the fiscal transfer to the provinces. Under the Federal-Provincial Fiscal 
Arrangements Act of 1967, provinces were initially entitled to receive 50 per cent of 
eligible operating expenditures incurred for post-secondary education and the equivalent 
of the senior matriculation level in high schools or $15 per capita, whichever was greater. 
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island have been reimbursed under 
the per capita payment provision of the Act, and since 1967-68 the "entitlement" of these 
provinces has been escalated by the annual rate of increase in eligible post-secondary oper-
ating expenditures in all provinces. 
Formally, the fiscal transfer to the provinces is made up of two components : 
equalized tax points and cash adjustment payments. The tax point transfer consists of 
4.357 equalized points of the personal income tax and 1 equalized point of corporate 
taxable income. The cash adjustment payment is determined residually as the amount by 
which a province's entitlement exceeds the value of the equalized tax points. 
Over the period 1967-68 to 1973-74, total annual transfers to the provinces have 
increased from $422 million to an estimated $1,066 million. All told, it is estimated that 
a total of $5.3 billion will have been transferred to the provinces when the present fiscal 
transfer arrangement expires in 1974. 
Chart 6 reveals that student aid from governmental sources and the post-secondary 
institutions in 1970-71 was almost double the amount made available in 1966-67 and 
twenty-five times student aid in 1960-61. Currently, about 8 per cent of all student aid 
flows through the institutions themselves (almost exclusively the universities). The Federal 
Government supports slightly more than half of non-institutional aid to students, and the 
Provincial Governments slightly less than half. 
Non-repayable aid presently amounts to about sixty-five per cent of total student 
aid. However, the Federal and Provincial Governments support quite different proportions 
of the repayable and non-repayable aid available to students. The Provincial Governments 
are the principal source of non-repayable student aid, provincial non-loan student aid 
being three times provincial loans to students. Student loans supported by the Federal 
Government are about equal to federal non-loan student aid.2 
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IV ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY 
When the present program of federal subsidies to higher education was initiated 
in the Fiscal Arrangements Act of 1967, the overriding concern of the Federal Govern-
ment was to allow the provinces to accommodate pressures on post-secondary enrolment, 
and to promote access to educational opportunities, by the injection of federal funds. 
As we have seen, these pressures on enrolment have, been accommodated, and the various 
factors underlying enrolment are unlikely to lead to a repetition of large rates of growth 
in the numbers of post-secondary students in the foreseeable future. The expiry of the 
Fiscal Arrangements Act in 1974 permits a reassessment of the federal role and federal 
goals in the financing of higher education. 
(1) Interpretation of Goals and Criteria for Policy Choices 
It seems useful to introduce briefly the question of why government is involved in 
educational activities at the post-secondary level at all. If such activity is undertaken by an 
individual to increase his or her earning power, benefits accrue directly to that individual. 
Why should the individual not bear all of the relevant costs ? Similarly, if the individual 
enters post-secondary education not in the expectation of monetary returns but for the 
intangible benefits and personal pleasures, immediate or deferred, that education promises, 
he or she can best judge their value relative to their costs. Here too, why should we not 
expect the individual to be fully responsible for meeting those costs ? Is there any neces-
sary role for government •— bearing in mind that that subsidy of these training or con-
sumption aspects of higher education entails diversion of scarce resources from other 
social uses, and loads the costs onto taxpayers generally, including many individuals who 
do not directly reap any gains from participation ? 
Before we proceed to attempt an answer to this question it has to be recognized 
that for many people the role for government in higher education is simply to mobilize 
resources for the support of an activity which is expected to fulfill some general social 
goals which are seldom articulated in concrete terms. If this attitude is widespread, 
involvement by governments is likely to continue, whether or not analysis views such 
intervention as "rational", or founded on objective evidence of social benefits that justify 
social investment. 
In viewing past federal policies and possible future directions, however, there is 
a responsibility to go behind this general expression of social will, and attempt to identify 
more specifically what purposes are intended to be served by government intervention, 
why in fact many people seem to desire government involvement in post-secondary educa-
tion, and what — if any —public goals might be jeopardized by the absence of such 
involvement. 
State intervention in post-secondary education may simply have the objective of 
correcting for market "imperfections" which prevent the individual from investing suf-
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ficiently in higher education to maximize his own well-being. The existence of such 
market imperfections means that from the point of view of efficiency in the allocation 
of society's resources, too little investment in higher education would be undertaken 
relative to investments in physical capital without government policies designed to correct 
for this bias. 
Another important reason for state subsidies to higher education is the belief that 
higher education produces benefits for society which cannot be appropriated by the indivi-
duals who undertake higher education. Where such "externalities" occur, private decisions 
may lead to an insufficient amount of higher education being undertaken from society's 
point of view. The conclusion that less than a socially "optional" amount of higher 
education might be produced in the absence of public subsidies is therefore an "efficiency" 
argument for public intervention in the sector, like the arguments for remedial action to 
correct for market imperfections which inhibit investments in human capital by the 
individual. 
Finally, government intervention may have the objective of equity in treatment of 
its citizens, and in the case of a federal government, equity in treatment of the federa-
tion's component regions. The Government of Canada's concern with the goals of inter-
regional and interpersonal equity requires little emphasis : many programs attest to the 
importance attached to these objectives, which may be loosely interpreted as those of 
helping low-income persons and regions. These equity goals may also be taken to sub-
sume the goal of equal opportunity, which implies a desire to remove artificial im-
pediments preventing individuals from realizing their individual capacities. 
(2) Measures Aimed at Several Goals 
Some types of government intervention in post-secondary education may be aimed 
simultaneously at advancing both equity and efficiency objectives. Thus, it has long been 
argued that owing to institutional arrangements in the labour market, too little investment 
in higher education and other types of "human capital" may be undertaken relative to 
investments in physical capital such as plant and equipment. The difficulty arises from 
the disparate liquidity of the assets formed as a result of "human"" and "physical" 
capital formation. Individuals who wish to borrow funds for physical capital formation 
can offer the assets to be acquired as collateral for the loan, and these assets can con-
sequently be liquidated by the lender in the event of default on the loan. On the other 
hand, potential lenders for the fact of human capital formation can acquire no such 
collateral, because the prospective investment will be "embodied" in the borrower, who 
cannot, of course, be sold in the event that he defaults on the loan. 
As a consequence, in the absence of state intervention in the market for "human 
capital," individuals will be prevented from making efficient investments in activities 
like higher education and total national production and consumption will be lower than 
it could be. Moreover, this market "imperfection" means that such investments in higher 
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education as are undertaken in practice will be financed largely from the resources of 
individuals and their families. It follows that persons from low-income backgrounds will 
be at a substantial disadvantage in making such investments. 
These arguments suggest that governments eliminate these market imperfections 
by "simulating" a human capital market; for example by acting as a guarantor for higher 
education loans made to individuals. And, of course, the Canada Student Loans Plan was 
introduced in 1964 precisely to cope with some of these difficulties faced by individuals 
who wish to borrow money to finance their own higher education. 
(3) Interregional Equity 
I earlier differentiated the federal goal of inter-regional equity from the goal of 
interpersonal equity on the grounds that the regional effects of central government policy 
have an importance of their own in a federation. For this reason, the effects of the current 
cost-sharing program in higher education on disbursements of federal monies to the 
individual provinces is of concern. Chart 7, which relates per capital fiscal transfers for 
post-secondary education to the provinces in 1971 to per capita provincial incomes in that 
year, suggests a generally positive relationship between levels of federal support for post-
secondary education and the average income of a province's residents. That is, the 
wealthier provinces have benefited the most under the terms of the current cost-sharing 
agreement, British Columbia being the conspicuous exception to the general rule. 
Explanations for this phenomenon arise on the sides of both supply and demand. 
Thus, it is well documented that the demand for higher education rises faster than 
income in countries such as ours. On the supply side, there is some evidence that the 
wealthier provinces can afford to mount larger post-secondary programs, and are, hence, 
able to take greater advantage of shared-cost arrangements. 
Recent proposals by the Federal Government to move towards a standard per 
capita transfer to the provinces for each youth in the 18-24 years age group presumably 
have been aimed, at least in part, at correcting the differences in provincial post-secondary 
entitlements which have arisen under the present cost-sharing program. 
(4) Interpersonal Equity 
Before seeking to determine how equitable among persons the present arrange-
ments for financing Canadian higher education are, we first need to ask another question. 
Who can or should proceed to higher education ? The obvious answer is that entry to 
higher education has been and must be fundamentally determined by the individual's 
ability to use the experience effectively, and it follows that post-secondary institutions 
will continue to rely primarily on measures of academic ability to decide who goes to our 
school of higher learning and who does not. This assumption leads to substantial im-
plications for governmental pursuit of the goal of interpersonal equity in higher educa-
tion. 
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CHART 7 
PER CAPITA POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION 
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A frequent interpretation of the goal of interpersonal equity as it relates to higher 
education has been the objective of attaining equity in treatment of those within the 
sector. This interpretation of the objective has largely been reflected in a concern about 
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the socio-economic composition of the student population. As is well-known, most stu-
dents presently come from relatively high-income backgrounds. 
While the objective of altering the socio-economic composition of the student 
body is undoubtedly well-meaning, there is in fact considerable doubt concerning whether 
much can be done to achieve this objective by expenditures at the post-secondary level 
of education. Unfortunately, the ability of students as measured by any of the conven-
tional indices appears to be highly correlated with parental income. An impressionistic 
picture of this correlation is given in Chart 8. The parental income of children is 
represented as highely skewed, while the "measured ability" of children is shown as 
being distributed normally in the familiar bell-shaped pattern. The contour map in 
Chart 8 indicates that greater than one-quarter of all high-ability children come from 
high-income families, and correspondingly fewer from families having less than modal 
incomes. 
The immediate implication of this association between academic ability and 
parental income is that even if youths with the required levels of ability participated in 
higher education to the same degree, attendance would still be much greater for youths 
from high-income families. The unfortunate fact is that altering this ability differential 
among children from different parental income backgrounds may only be possible by 
taking remedial measures very early in the life of the child. The literature reflects some 
doubt about whether much can be achieved once a child enters the schooling system3 
and expenditures at the post-secondary level of education would seem to be irrelevant 
to this problem. 
Let us now introduce the present methods of financing higher education, and 
consider how these affect our equity goals. I would like to contrast a laisser faire, or what 
I shall call a "19th Century" situation, with our present methods of financing. The 19th 
Century situation is illustrated in Chart 9. Attendance at post-secondary institutions is 
seen to be correlated with family income. Attendance of a small number of high-ability 
students from low-income backgrounds is supported by charity (foundations, churches, 
etc.), while the fees of most students are financed from parental income. Parental income 
also permits the attendance of some students who do not have the requisite ability to 
complete post-secondary education. There is no financing burden on the taxpayer whose 
children do not participate in higher education. 
Of course, the current methods of financing Canadian higher education differ 
substantially from the laisser faire picture I have just described. The effect of intervention 
by all levels of government has been, as indicated earlier, that government support now 
constitutes about 80 per cent of the revenue of Canadian post-secondary institutions, 
while fees account for about 10 per cent. These governmental expenditures can be viewed 
as a flat subsidy to all participants in higher education, regardless of their family back-
ground. Chart 10, "The 20th Century Situation," attempts to depict —- again in im-
pressionistic terms — the effects of these subsidies. 




DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN 
BY FAMILY INCOME AND ABILITY 
Immediately evident from Chart 10 is the almost certain increase in enrolment 
over the 19th Century situation which has resulted from the introduction of substantial 
government subsidies. The increase in enrolment is represented as not being uniform 
across all parental income classes, partly owing to the supposition noted earlier : that 
the academic ability of students is not uniformly distributed by parental income class. 
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CHART 9 
"19TH CENTURY" SITUATION* 
(I.E. No Governmental Subsidies) 
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MINIMUM ACADEMIC STANDARD 
FOR P.S.E. COMPLETION 
* This chart should be interpreted as follows : each child has a position on the plane. 
The distribution of the children is in accordance with the contours shown in the previous chart. 
There is a high probability that children in the cross hatched area obtain post-secondary education, 
and conversely for the children in the balance of the area. 
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CHART 10 
"20TH CENTURY" SITUATION 
I.E. Mixture of Private Finance, Public Subsidies 
and Public Fixed-Term Student Loans 
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I would also like to draw your attention to the probable rise which has occurred 
in the number of students with less than the minimum academic standard required to 
complete post-secondary education. The provision of extensive governmental subsidies 
has reduced the incentives of youths to stay out of higher education or seriously consider 
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alternatives to higher education, and likely has encouraged more youths to become stu-
dents who cannot "make the grade." 
Perhaps most important, however, are the windfall gains and losses which have 
occurred as a result of government intervention in the sector. The windfall gain accrues 
to those students (to their families) who would have attended post-secondary education 
without any governmental subsidy. We have every reason to believe that the numbers of 
such students are substantial. After all, the monetary returns which accrue from much of 
higher education —• particularly undergraduate schooling — as sufficiently high in rela-
tion to the total public and private costs to make such schooling an attractive investment 
to the individual.4 Nor do these calculations take account of the nonmonetary attractions— 
such as immediate and deferred consumption benefits — which are commonly associated 
with participation in higher education. Where adequate facilities are available which 
allow students to finance their own education, we might therefore reasonably expect that 
public subsidies are not necessary to ensure the continued participation of many students. 
Where the subsidy is not necessary to alter behaviour, of course, it represents a 
flat transfer from general tax revenues to a specific interest group. 
The converse of this proposition, of course, is that as shown in Chart 10 some 
of the public subsidy to higher education entails a windfall loss to those taxpayers who 
share the tax burden of the public subsidy but whose children do not participate in 
higher education. 
Our discussion of who benefits and who pays for the costs of higher education 
has so far been focussed on the parental income of students, thus reflecting a long-standing 
public concern with the problem of social mobility over time, and also the importance 
of parental savings as a source of financing for post-secondary participation in the past. 
Allow me to point out, however, that such a focus on the parental status of students 
is increasingly anomalous now that every 18 year old Canadian student has federal voting 
rights and accompanying responsibilities as a citizen. These kinds of considerations have 
led many to view the question of equity in the financing of higher education costs as a 
question of the distribution of the costs and benefits over the lifetimes of those who 
participate in higher education relative to those in their generation who do not. 
Shifting attention away from a concern with the parental income of students and 
towards comparisons of the prospects of students and those who do not get to participate 
in higher education possibly leads to even more clear-cut attitudes towards the financing 
of higher education costs. Because students are selected on the grounds of ability, and 
because higher education augments earnings, on average, post-secondary students have 
much superior income prospects than do the four-fifths of youths who at present do not 
participate in higher education. In these respects, therefore, the use of the tax system to 
subsidize post-secondary education appears to force taxpayers with relatively low incomes 
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to share in the costs of an activity yielding its greatest benefits primarily to those already 
having the highest potential incomes. 
Of course, it might be asked whether there is any net subsidy to post-secondary 
students, in view of the fact that they pay more taxes on the higher earnings they acquire 
as a result of receiving a college education. Unfortunately, it is by no means true that — 
even in aggregate — the higher taxes paid by working graduates have a discounted value 
sufficient to offset the value of the subsidies they received as students.5 Moreover, this 
type of argument completely ignores a fact noted eailier : that many students would con-
sider higher education a worthwhile investment in its own right, even without the 
benefit of public subsidies. Where such students would undertake higher education 
without public subsidies, they would in any event be paying more taxes on the higher 
earnings they acquire as a result of receiving a college education. It should also be noted 
that two individuals with the same income will pay the same tax even if one of them did 
not enjoy an education subsidy. 
Shifting More of the Costs to Students 
Provincial commission reports, such as that of the Commission on Post-Secondary 
Education in Ontario and inter-provincial enquiries such as the Peitchinis Report for the 
Provincial Council of Ministers of Education, strongly suggest that those participating 
in higher education should bear more of the costs of the process.6 
However, proposals to shift more of the burden of higher education costs to 
students pose problems. Again, a divergence appears between those who think that 
equitable financing arrangements for higher education should take cognizance of the 
financial circumstances of a student's parents and those who focus on equity in treatment 
of students and their peers who do not participate in higher education.7 
It is frequently argued that shifting more of the burden of higher education costs 
to students will have adverse effects on the size and socio-economic composition of the 
student body, if the only means of self-financing available to students are conventional 
fixed-term loan plans such as the Canada Student Loans Plan. It is argued that, even if 
the private benefits from higher education are great, eighteen year old students — 
particularly those from low income backgrounds — are "risk averse," and would not 
undertake investments in higher education in amounts which are "efficient" from society's 
point of view if they could only obtain finance through conventional loan plans. 
We suffer from a lack of evidence on this hypothesis. Nevertheless, those who 
accept the hypothesis usually favour dealing with the problem either by student grants 
which are means-tested with respect to parental income, or by introducing loan plans 
where repayment is contingent upon income received after completion of schooling, or a 
combination of these two measures. 
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Proposals to extend means-tested grants to students would seem to be unacceptable 
to those who regard the question of equity in the financing of higher education as con-
cerning equity in treatment of students and their peers who do not enter higher education. 
After all, students are selected on the basis of their ability, and even giving them grants 
which are means-tested with respect to parental income and paying for these grants 
partly by taxing the peers of students who do not participate in higher education would 
seem to amount to a redistribution of income from the relatively poor and ill-endowed to 
the relatively rich and well-endowed. 
Proposals to introduce loan plans where repayment is contingent upon income 
after completion of schooling would not seem to be subject to the above objection, 
insofar as these loan plans need not be subsidized out of the public purse. However, 
this is not to say that such plans are without their own problems. Let me focus attention 
on one such problem. 
Consider the equity effects of proposals to raise fees and simultaneously introduce 
an income-contingent loan plan. In order to examine only the most important effects, 
I shall indicate uncertainty by comparing "favourable" and "unfavourable" assumptions 
concerning the outcome of such proposals. 
The probable impact of such a change under 'unfavourable" assumptions is shown 
in Chart 11. It can be seen that these assumptions imply that the proposals will bring 
about an overall reduction in the size of the post-secondary sector (enrolment will 
retreat from the dotted line to the solid line). Chart 11 also reflects the pessimistic 
assumption that able students from low-income backgrounds are so "risk averse" that they 
will not undertake loans even where repayment is contingent upon income after com-
pletion of schooling. The chart shows the primary beneficiaries of an income-contingent 
loan plan to be students from middle-income backgrounds. 
Chart 12 reflects "favourable" assumptions concerning the proposals to raise fees 
and introduce an income-contingent loan plan. One can see that a reduction in the number 
of less-able students from high income backgrounds is balanced by the fact that the 
introduction of the new loan plan encourages the entry of able students from low and 
middle-income backgrounds who would otherwise not have entered higher education. 
An important thing to note about both Chart 11 and 12, however, is that concern 
about the effects of proposals to raise fees and introduce income-contingent loan plans 
on the size of student enrolment and the socio-economic composition of the student body 
is a concern about margins. The charts imply that the vast majority of students now in 
higher education would remain there after the introduction of the measures contemplated. 
The charts also imply that these measures would bring about a major redistribution of 
the financing burden in higher education : the costs would be unequivocally shifted to 
those who participate in higher education and away from those who do not go on to 
our schools of higher learning. 
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CHART 11 
EFFECTS OF PROPOSALS FOR 
(1) Fees Covering Most of Tuition Cost 
(2) Loan Plan Where Repayment is contingent on Income After Graduation : 
Unfavourable Assumptions 
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While the important effect of shifting a greater share of the cost burden on to 
those who attend post-secondary education institutions can be reliably forecasted, the 
marginal effects on the size and socio-economic composition of the student body are 
not known. Conceivably, the gain in equity between users and non-users would be more 
than offset by unfavourable marginal effects. Here, further analysis of income-contingent 
loan plans could play a useful role in assisting political decision-makers. Can it be 
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CHART 12 
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shown that the "unfavourable" assumptions I have outlined above are unlikely to occur 
if an income-contingent loan plan were introduced ? If not, it seems to me that advocates 
of such plans are asking Ministers to take a policy gamble with unknown odds in a 
highly sensitive area. 
"S T O A 137 
Social Benefits From Higher Education 
Leaving aside the question as to whether or not it would be appropriate to shift 
more of the burden of financing from the general taxpayer to the individual who acquires 
the education, there can be little doubt that the present massive federal and provincial 
subsidies for higher education have been based on the belief that the process leads not 
only to benefits which are captured by those undertaking higher education, but also to 
benefits which cannot be captured by individuals and which accrue to society at large. 
This is not the place for an exhaustive catalogue of the social benefits often claimed 
to arise from higher education. Nevertheless, governmental support for higher education 
in Canada has obviously been conditioned by a belief in the social benefits arising from 
such roles of higher education as those of advancing knowledge, as a critic of the existing 
social order, in promoting economic growth, in preserving and enriching the cultural 
heritage of the nation, and in contributing to the functioning of democracy by the creation 
of a more informed electorate. 
An increasing disposition to question the value of the social benefits from higher 
education has arisen in recent years. Some segments of the public have clearly come to 
associate negative or undesirable spillovers with the sector. Criticism from the man in 
the street has been augmented by academic scepticism about the magnitude or even the 
very existence of external benefits from higher education.8 (Parenthetically and para-
doxically, it is this academic function of acting as a gadfly of existing social institutions 
which is surely one of the most valuable external benefits of the higher education sector 
in our society !) 
In assessing the federal role in the financing of higher education, I would expect 
that there is general agreement with the argument that higher education leads to many 
of the public benefits traditionally attributed to the sector. This having been said, how-
ever, one can still ask whether present financing arrangements are optimal in some sense 
for the production of these public benefits. Specifically, is the present degree of public 
subsidy necessary to produce these public benefits ? Is the present method of federal 
financing conducive to obtaining these benefits ? Might alternative forms of public 
expenditure lead to greater benefits for the same cost ? I propose to examine these ques-
tions in the order in which they have been raised. 
In considering the first question, it seems clear that some of these generalized 
public benefits were made available without cost to the public in general in the days 
when universities operated entirely without subsidies. Presumably, the greater the sub-
sidies the greater the public benefits — but how much greater per dollar of subsidy ? 
In one instance, at least, even the basic presumption may be invalid. Is the function 
of universities in providing criticism of public policies likely to be more adequately 
served by more public subsidies ? 
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One can also question whether other public benefits often attributed to higher 
education might better be obtained by alternative government program expenditures, 
and whether present arrangements for federal support of higher education are optimal 
for achieving the desired objectives. The social and cultural objectives of government are 
a case in point. Although higher education obviously contributes to the creation of a 
literate and informed citizenry and to the passing on of our cultural heritage, it is clear 
that we primarily entrust these tasks to the lower stages of education where attendance 
is, for the most part, compulsory. Any additional promotion of these objectives which is 
thought to be necessary perhaps might be better effected by channelling more public 
monies into lower levels of education, rather than to the one-fifth of the 18-24 years age 
group which participates in higher education. As Edward F. Denison remarks, "Broad 
dispersion of these benefits seems more likely to enhance social welfare than heavy 
concentration on the academically talented." 9 I am not, of course, suggesting that this is 
a role that the Federal Government should assume — clearly this is a field for which 
the provinces are solely responsible. However, the Federal Government's recent proposal 
to substitute per capita grants to the provinces for the current shared-cost program, if 
adopted, could remove a bias towards that kind of education which may be least effective 
in addressing these social and cultural objectives. The attainment of these social and 
economic objectives also can be pursued by subsidies directed to programs specifically 
affecting these areas, rather than by the present system of universal federal subsidies to 
post-secondary education. 
One might even question whether the existing system of universal federal sub-
sidies to higher education is the most appropriate method of supporting the sector in the 
functions where its claims on the public purse are perhaps strongest: that is, in the role 
of advancing knowledge, particularly by means of "basic research." 
The feature which distinguishes "basic" from "applied" research is that its fruits 
are largely inappropriable by the party undertaking the research and accrue to the public 
at large. This "public good" characteristic of basic research, as well as its inherent 
riskiness and the impossibility of insuring against such risks, mean than an inadequate 
amount of such research may be carried out unless the process is financed by society. 
The argument in favour of public support of such research activities is also strengthened 
by the fact that these inappropriable advances in knowledge also advance the goal of 
economic growth. 
Granted, therefore, that a strong case for public subsidies to basic research can 
be made, it has to be recognized that basic research can be fostered directly without 
supporting higher education in general : specific subsidies conceivably could be more 
effective. On the other hand, it has long been argued that some of these research activities 
are inseparable for much of higher education — especially graduate education. In my 
own view this is one of the most persuasive arguments for providing an underlying level 
of public subsidy to higher education, 
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But how much money should the public provide in order to obtain these social 
benefits from higher education ? Other public goods, such as the goals of reducing 
income inequality among individuals and regions in Canada, also have strong claims for 
support by the Federal Government. Moreover, shifting funds from private hands to 
public hands through greater taxation and borrowing means fewer resources devoted to 
private purposes. Because resources are limited governments have to make painful choices 
among alternative "good things." The burden of my argument, however, is that there is 
no reason to regard the present mix of public and private finance for higher education 
as ideal. In particular, a number of studies conducted by or for provincial governments 
have tried to make the case that those who participate in higher education should bear a 
larger share of its costs. I have tried to set forth some of the basic assumptions on which 
that case seems to rest. Would further analysis serve to validate those assumptions ? 
If the assumptions are in principle or practice untestable, then those who propose the 
change are asking Ministers to agree either that the gain in equity between users and 
non-users is great enough to more than offset any potential deterioration in the number 
or mix of users or to gamble that the latter unfavourable effects will not occur. Un-
fortunately, however, the odds are not known ! Can Ministers take such a gamble in an 
area so sensitive as this ? 
Notes 
1. Under the terms of the present cost-sharing .arrangement for post-secondary expenditures, 
operating expenditures associated with high school education at the senior matriculation level 
are also eligible for federal contributions. 
2. The Federal Government's main impact on student aid has been through the Canada Student 
Loans Plan. The Plan guarantees loans for students attending post-secondary institutions on 
a full-time basis, and the actual loans are advanced by chartered banks and other designated 
lenders on the basis of certificates of eligibility issued by provinces participating in the Plan. 
The Federal Government carries the cost of interest payments on these loans while^the students 
continue full-time studies and for six months afterwards. (Such subsidies are included in 
non-loan aid to students in Chart 6.) The Province of Quebec does not participate in the 
Canada Student Loans Plan but receives an alternate payment from the Federal Government 
which is roughly equivalent to what would have been paid to Quebec students, plus interest 
costs, if the province had participated in the CSLP. 
3. To quote E.G. West, 
"Equality of opportunity in lower schooling apparently implies a policy of counter-
acting environmental handicaps confronting some children. Even this argument seems 
a little 'innocent' today when studies increasingly show that family influence, both 
genetic and cultural, play a dominant role in academic performance." 
"Efficiency versus Equity in Higher Education," (unpublished manuscript, Carleton University, 
1973), p. 21. 
4. As is made clear by the information on the "social" rates of return to higher education in 
the Eighth Annual Review of the Economic Council of Canada. See Design for Decision-
Making, (Ottawa : Information Canada, 1971), pp. 205-213. 
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5. This fact can be demonstrated rather simply. The usual estimates of so-called "social" rates 
of return from higher education calculate what the increase in private earnings before taxes 
associated with higher education represent as a yield on the total costs, both public and private. 
On the other hand, estimates of "private" rates of return from higher education calculate 
what the increases in private earnings after taxes associated with higher education represent 
as a yield on the private costs. Provided estimates of the social.rates of return fall short of 
estimates of the private rates of return, it therefore follows that students do not repay in 
taxes the subsidies they receive while obtaining their education. The Economic Council's 8th 
Annual Report contains one of the most recent and comprehensive sets of estimates of the 
returns to higher education in Canada, and shows no case where the "social" rates of return 
exceed private yields. See Economic Council of Canada, 8th Annual Report, Design for Deci-
sion-Making, (Ottawa : Information Canada, 1971), pp. 205-213. 
6. Stephen G. Peitchinis, Financing Post-Secondary Education in Canada, (Calgary : Council of 
Ministers of Education in Canada, 1971) ; The Learning Society, Report of the Commission 
on Post-Secondary Education in Ontario, (Toronto : Ministry of Government Services, Ontario, 
1972). 
7. There are those, of course, who argue that the logic of the goal of interpersonal equity 
implies higher transfers to those born with less than the average wit among us, and fewer 
transfers to post-secondary students : 
"If poverty or inequality is considered a problem, one should recognize that the poorest 
among us, and the one most deserving of help from his fellow men, is the one whom 
nature forgot to endow with brains — and that the way to make it up to him is 
not to exclude him from school and tax him to pay part of the cost of educating his 
intellectually well-endowed and no-longer-poor peer group among the children of poor 
parents, but to give him money in lieu of the brains he lacks. Superior intelligence 
or skill is undoubtedly more economically useful than the absence of it, but discrimi-
nating in favour of it by fiscal subsidization will not necessarily produce a more 
democratic and poverty free or egalitarian society. 
Harry Johnson, "The Alternatives Before Us," Journal of Political Economy (May-June, 
1972 : Special issue on Investment in Education : The Equity-Efficiency Quandary), 289. 
8. Thus, according to Hansen and Weisbrod 
"Our apparent scepticism about either the existence or significance of the widely dis-
cussed external benefits from higher education stems principally from the absence of 
any substantial body of evidence in support of them". 
W . Lee Hansen and Burton A. Weisbrod, Benefits, Costs and Finance of Public Higher 
Education, (Chicago : Aiarkham Publishing Company, 1969), p. 40. 
9. "An Aspect of Inequality of Opportunity," Journal of Political Economy, 78 (September/ 
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